

Comparative analysis on Peace Accords in North East: Special reference to the Naga and the Mizo

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Abstract

The political dialogue between the State and different major ethnic groups in the context of India's North East cannot be taken into isolation. One movement influences the other similarly as one accord has its impact on the next. The political dialogue brought forward by the Naga movement has influence the MNF movement not only in terms of its ideology but also in term of its approaches to the State. The two movements in the hills of India's North East with all the differences affect one another particular of the Naga to the Mizo, in carrying forward the dialogue for peace accords. The article looks in to the process of peace building of the two hills, first with the Naga and then the Mizo. It analyses on how the peace process has been initiated and the agreement signed with the Indian State has further impact on the movement. It tries to address the reason behind the success and failure of the peace accord between the Naga and the Mizo and the connection of the accords.

The present situations in the North East leave a wide gap on the 'peace accord' signed by various groups; insurgents, students, communities, etc. to settle their ongoing issues but still remains contested under different circumstances. The first experience created by the Naga for independent state has been subsequently followed by different ethnic groups to claim their 'rights' which hold one of the main themes of politics in the North East. The term displayed by various groups or communities range from the 'right to self determination' to the establishment of territorial autonomy or separate arrangement under the Indian federal system. While the

Naga desire for sovereign state, the Bodo aspiration for separate state has been paused to the creation of the Bodo Territorial Council (Baruah 2005: 190, Wilkinson 2004: 171), the tribals in Tripura fought for a greater share in the state government and redrawn of tribal areas (Debbarma 2006: 407-8), All Assam Students' Union (AASU) and All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) demand for strict regulation on immigrants and surveillance on the question of citizenship (Govt. of Assam 2012), even Mizoram which claimed to be the most peaceful state in the North East after the signing the peace accord is not free from

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the interference of insurgent operation. It would not be wrong to claim that various 'insurgent' groups used the term 'sovereign' or 'independent' for their movement to claim the highest possible goal but in actual practice, the claim has been settled under the federal principles of Indian Constitution.

Right from the dawn of independence the Indian State put effort to pacify the political imbroglio and integrate the North East through various constitutional mechanisms. An initiative has been taken up by the State to come to a definite term on peace building through the signing of political dialogue which is passionately often called 'peace accord'. But a larger question still needs to be addressed in the present context on the success and failure of the 'peace accord'. It also created 'doubt' and the extent of the promises delivered by the so called "Peace Accord" remains blurred. It is therefore necessary to have a critical inquiry on the process of the arrival of different 'Peace Accords' and how far the accords have accommodated the unrests that have persisted till today.

What was worth noticing in the accord signed by the Naga and the Mizo was that, unlike the other accords, the institutional design led to the formation of separate states to ensure peace building on one side. Second, the peace accord did not only lead to the formation of separate states for the Naga and the Mizo but the insertion of special provisions under Article 371A and 371G respectively that gives high degree of autonomy to the state under the

Indian federal structure. Therefore, in the present paper, an analysis is made on the peace process by making comparative studies on the Naga and the Mizo on the ground that the Naga movement and settlement process had influences on the MNF movement and in the signing of Memorandum of Settlement. The first part deals with the various initiatives taken for peace process to settle the Naga and the creation of separate state of Nagaland for ensuring peace but fail. The second part makes a brief inquiry on the MNF movement and the tactical response by the Indian State and the signing of 'Peace Accord'. The last part of the paper draws the similarity in the nature of the political dialogue of the accord signed by the Naga (NPC) and the Mizo (MNF).

The Peace process on the Naga issues

The first ever peace building in the North East was seen as early as 1946 when the Naga under the banner of Naga National Council (NNC) appealed to the British administrators and the Indian leaders to 'decide their political future' after the British Government leave the subcontinent (Elwin 1997: 51; Alemchiba 1970: 169). They were persuaded to sign political dialogue called Nine-Point Agreement in June 1947¹ (Yonou 1984: 161; Srikanth & Thomas 2005: 60). According to the last point, Article 9 of the agreement, it was written and agreed that ten years after the agreement "the Nagas will be free to decide their future". The last point soon became the point of contestation between the NNC and the Indian Government because

the Naga leaders assumed that after ten years they will be free to choose their future (Iralu 2005: 183). It was AZ Phizo who interpreted the clause to mean that “the Nagas had the right to become politically independent after ten years” (Srikanth & Thomas 2005: 61).

It seems that the Government of India which was overwhelmed with the process of state building insisted that Article 9 of the Agreement gave “the Naga the right to suggest administrative changes within the Indian Union, but not secede” (Das 2007: 23; Chasie 2005: 48). As a result, the hardliner within the NNC called upon the people to prepare for self-determination and gradually discarded the Nine-Point Agreement on the ground that Article 9 was ‘misinterpreted’ by the Government of India (Yonou 1984: 164 -8; Chasie 2005: 48-52). The situation enraged the NNC that declared independence on August 14, 1947. Prior to this, the Naga had neither sent representative nor accepted the term of the Sub-Committee on the North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas, the committee entrusted by the Constituent Assembly to integrate the Hills of India’s north east (Yonou 1984: 185). In response, the Premier of Assam, Gopinath Bardoloi who was also the Chairman of Sub-Committee declared the Ninth Point Agreement invalid (Chasie 2005: 52). The ‘Sixth Schedule’ has been enforced for the Hills Districts of the undivided Assam that included Naga Hills without their consent. The Constituent Assembly later adopted

the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India after it went through rigorous debates on 5, 6 and 7 September 1949 to accommodate the tribals of the former “Excluded Areas” and Partially Excluded areas of Colonial Assam so that each hill district will be constituted as Autonomous District (Rao 2006: 681-779).

The NNC totally rejected the Sixth Schedule² and did not send any representative to the meeting of political parties of the Hills District in Shillong on July, 1951 to show their total rejection to the Sixth Schedule (*Zoram Thupuan* 1951: 1). The indifferent attitude of the Indian State against the Naga had been exerted to the extent of boycotting the Assembly and the Parliamentary elections held in 1952 and then, the NNC started to infuriate their demand for Independence through the formation of Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) in 1956 (Srikanth & Thomas, op cit.: 62). In response to the Naga outraged, the Indian state resorted to parallel strategy to settle the situation in which counter insurgency operation against the extremist groups was simultaneously carried out along the peace talk with the moderate leaders (Rajagopalan 2008: 14).

The talk between the moderate leaders of the Naga and the Indian Government was culminated in the signing of accord in 1960. During the peace process, the Naga leaders under the banner of Naga People’s Convention (NPC) headed by Imkongliba Ao assigned the task of mediating peace between the FGN and the

Government of India and resolved to settle the Naga issue through negotiation. On the peace process, the NPC had endeavored to gather the opinion of the different tribes across the Naga Hills and held three conventions; first at Kohima on August 22-26, 1957 which was boycotted by the extremist; Second convention was held at Ungma between May 21 and 23, 1958, arrived forming a selected committee to draft a constitution for the future of Nagaland. The committee put forth Sixteen Point on December 11 and 12, 1958 which the underground totally rejected. Still though, third NPC at Mokokchung from 22 to 26 October 1959 discussed the draft constitution (Elwin 1997: 67; Alemchiba 1970: 197; Nuh 2002: 191-8). Finally in July 1960, Nehru announced in the parliament for the acceptance of the Sixteen Points Agreement (Bareh 1970: 55).

The initiative taken by the moderates finally culminated in the signing of accord in Delhi on July 16, 1960 by the Naga People's Convention (NPC) and the Government of India which was called the Sixteenth Points Agreement. The agreement accepted the integration of Naga inhabited areas under the Indian Union and thus, dropped the last controversial point of the Naga-Akbar Hydari Accord which states 'the freedom to choose their political future by the Naga'.

The Sixteenth Points Agreement had resulted to the formation of separate state of Nagaland on December 1, 1963 and it became the first state in India to be created not on the basis of linguistic but on

ethnic line. Moreover, as specified in the Accord, Article 371A was inserted to the Constitution of India which provided the State of Nagaland higher degree of autonomy as compare to other states in the North East. But, The creation of separate state for the Naga did not seem to cease the Naga aspiration for 'sovereignty' and resulted in the division between those who accepted to come under the Constitution of India and those who did not.

The consequence of the Agreement led to the assassination of the main architect of the 'accord', Imkongliba Ao, in 1961 (Singh 2012: 6). Since then, numbers of talk were held between the Government of India and the NNC followed by the entry of the third party, the Government of Nagaland. The involvement of the third party was also blamed as it created the situation more confusing due to different term put forth by the state government which inclined toward the Government of India.(Welman 2011: 239). The involvement of the state government had a repercussion effect as an assassination attempt was made on the then Chief Minister Hokishe Sema on August 8, 1972 (Bhaumik 2005: 218). This incident added 'fuel to the fire' on the ongoing operation against the militancy that resulted in the proclamation of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 in the state. In addition, against the Sixteenth Point Agreement, the affair of the state of Nagaland was transferred from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The proclama-

tion was subsequently followed by the declaration of NNC, Federal Government of Nagaland and Naga Army as 'unlawful organisations' (Bhaumik 2005: 218).

For the Naga the situation seemed to become worse in 1975, when the 'representatives of underground organisation' signed an agreement with L P Singh, the then Governor of Assam and Nagaland on November 11, 1975 (Welman 2011: 241). This agreement was popularly known as Shillong Accord in which one underground group accepted to surrender arms and 'unconditionally' accepted the Constitution of India (Welman 2011: 242; Nag 2002: 275). The Accord was totally rejected by the NNC for what they called 'selling the Naga nation' by accepting the Constitution of India. It seems that the Shillong Accord was zero end game for the Naga as the accord did not bring any positive result or institutional change to neither side of the parties within the Naga (over ground or underground) as it had unconditionally accepted the term laid by the Government of India (Bhaumik 2005: 219). Soon, the Naga movement had been disintegrated into different factions defining their own term of references for the political future of the Naga (Bhaumik 2005: 220).

Further historical inquiries show that it was not the Shillong Accord which Iralu blamed but the Sixteenth Point Agreement as the root of all disintegration to the Naga movement that culminated in the formation of different insurgent groups within the Naga. He states: "as for subsequent

Naga history and tragedies, if there had been no NPC and no 16-Point Agreement in 1960, there never would have been Revolutionary Government surrender in 1973, or a Shillong Accord in 1975, or an NSCN in 1980 and 1988 or a second NNC in 1990" (Iralu b 2003).

The above analysis shows that the Naga movement had witnessed a series of political dialogue to bring peace to the Naga inhabited areas. But, the signing of peace accord did not eventually brought the desirable answer; on the contrary, it further intensified the movement or created a new space to the new groups to further elaborate their cause. One simple answer to the reason for the unsuccessful peace process was nothing but the inability of the Indian government to persuade the Naga to divert the idea of full sovereignty and the reorganization of the Naga's inhabited areas at the cost of the neighbouring states. This had created a lack of congruity between the warring parties which includes the Government of India, the insurgent groups and the state government, thus, leave a space for unending debates on the Naga issues.

Mizo National Front and the strategy interplayed by the State

In the case of the Mizo, a question remains on whether the idea of full sovereignty was present at the dawn of Independence because the first two political parties, the Mizo Union and the United Mizo Freedom Organization, hardly gave a concrete interpretation on the notion of full sovereign state for the Mizo. While

the Mizo Union fought for the autonomy of the Mizo under the state of Assam, the UMFO exaggerated the joining of Burma that had short lived and literally became null after the Independence.

Though an argument can be made as in the case of the Naga, the Mizo's anxiousness of their political future was witnessed on the eve of Independence. The last colonial administrator of the Mizo district convened a meeting of fifty people at Aizawl which was attended by the leaders of Mizo Union and Zalen parties, leaders of NGOs, prominent citizens including ex-armies and made resolutions for the safeguard of Mizo under the Indian union. The meeting resolved three points in which the last point states: "That the Lushais will be allowed to opt out of the Indian Union when they wish to do so, subject to a minimum period of ten year".³

The above propositions did not seem to receive any attention of the policy makers because of two conditions. First, the proposition was made on the last day of the British rule in India after the Bardoloi sub-committee looked into the matter whether Mizo had already prepared the draft proposal to the Constituent Assembly or not. Second, it was cleared that the provision of district autonomy under the Sixth Schedule was incorporated according to the demand of the Mizo Union during the Bardoloi Committee visit at Aizawl on April 17, 1947 (Lalbuaia 2002: 58-59).⁴ But, if one looks back to the demand of the Mizo Union and the district autonomy under the Sixth Schedule, there

was a huge difference on the term of 'autonomy' which needs no further elaboration.

In the case of the Mizo, it was when the MNF started movement for separate Mizo nation that the idea of full sovereignty came to the front. The outbreak of MNF movement on the midnight of February 28, 1966 received quick response from the Indian State which was severe than any other response made by the Indian forces to any insurgent groups till today (*see* Hluna 2008, Dommen 1967: 735-6).

What remains questionable was the subsequent heavy air strikes poured down on twelve targets including Aizawl by the Indian Air Force on March, 1966 even before the MNF was declared 'outlaw' by the Indian Government (Sen 2007). This event was questioned by Arijit Sen (2007), CNN-IBN correspondence, which described the event as, "the attack on Indian by the Indian forces has been deleted from history". This incident was soon followed by the regrouping of villages by the Indian Army between 1967 to 1970, whereby nearly 75 per cent of the total populations of the Mizo Hills were affected and the political activities of the Mizo hills stood still (*for detail see*, Nunthara 1981, 1996: 251- 4). The regrouping of villages was though defended by the Army on various ground but it was logically argued by Sundar (2011: 50) who states that, 'the central logic behind grouping is to isolate insurgents from the general population from which they derive

their support, cutting off their food and other supplies'. The whole counter insurgency programme including grouping of village carried by the Indian State was the concept borrowed from Thompson (1967) theory to defeat the communist movement in Malaya. But the tragedy was that it had been applied at totally different context without any proper plan and strategy. As of today, there is hardly any, including the military personal, which see the positive side of village grouping.

An assumption can be made on the reason behind the severe Indian military intervention against the MNF movement because the Indian government was overwhelmed with a policy of 'territorial integration', to defend the very idea at any cost. This staunch character of the Indian state soon left the MNF with limited choice but to seek solutions by receding certain demands made by them which finally result to come under the Constitution of India.

Moreover, learning from the Naga experiences the Indian government cautiously made tactical approaches to solve the MNF movement. First, when the North East was re-organised for the creation of separate states for Manipur, Tripura and Meghalaya; Mizo District was left out of the state formation but upgraded to the Union territory (see, The North-Eastern Areas (Re-Organisation) Act, 1971). Assumption can be made that an institutional approach was made to upgrade the Mizo District to a central controlled Union Territory in order to create space for counter-

ing the MNF movement. Otherwise the political leaders of the Mizo District viz., the Mizo Union had made constant demands for the separate state for the Mizo, were persuaded by the central authority to reconcile the demand to Union Territory with Legislative Assembly and cabinet system of government (Hermana 1999: 143-44). On the other hand, the demand made by the Garo and Khasi leaders were granted thereby creating the state of Meghalaya.

The second argument on the Indian State approaches to the MNF movement was based on the experience of Naga movement. It was learnt that simply by sanctioning the apparatus of the statehood does not end the 'secessionist aspiration' unless the insurgent groups were crucial part of it. As such, if the MNF were not part of process for state formation, there seem to be a strong feeling on the part of the central authority that creation of statehood will not bring peaceful solution, instead it can further intensified the movement as experience in the case of the Naga.

In the case of MNF movement, the peace process had been designed cautiously from the past experiment and had succeeded. The success of the dialogue also embedded in the absence of strong faction to challenge the terms and condition of the settlement, otherwise it is prevalent in the case of the Naga. Therefore, MNF movement was settled through the signing of "Memorandum of Settlement" by the Government of India, the MNF and the Government of Mizoram on

June 30, 1986 and then conferment of statehood. The political dialogue of peace accord was soon followed by the insertion of Article 371G to the constitution of India to protect the Mizo from the central intervention, and finally, the formation of separate state of Mizoram on February 20, 1987.

Institutional design to accommodate 'Peace Accord': Limitations and challenges

The Indian Constitution creates two special provisions to accommodate the unrest that exist in the context of the North East right from the adoption of the Constitution. The first provision was the Sixth Schedule (Autonomous District) that had been originally designed to apply uniformly for the hills tribal's district of the former 'excluded areas'. But with the different form of 'movement' exerted by various ethnic communities, the Sixth Schedule has been time and again flexibly structured to contain the ethnic assertion. On the other end, right from the insertion of the Sixth Schedule, it was rejected by the Naga who demanded the right to self determination and made the Indian State left with no choice, which resulted to the insertion of new Article in the Constitution of India i.e., Article 371A. Since then, Article 371⁵ has been used as an 'instrument' intended to 'facilitate the flexible and adaptable application of the federal principle in specific cases' (Ramasubramaniam 1992: 8).

The two provisions are the outcomes of long negotiation and struggle between the Indian State and the groups who de-

mand for recognition and autonomy within the Indian Constitution. In other words the provision can be termed as the result of 'Settlement' arrived by the parties involved to ensure 'peace' process in the region concerned.

The important 'value' underlying in the success of the 'peace accord' is the way in which the 'Memorandum of Settlement' or 'Agreement' are arrived by the parties involved, the way it was institutionalized for delivering its promises (Dev 2006: 199). Whenever peace accord was signed, first and foremost, the parties involved always ensured the commitment on the side of the central government and the state government. The highest form of such commitment is to insert 'special provision' in the Constitution of India, to put limitation on the State authority to have direct accessed to the 'accord' without the consent of the concerned group. As we have seen in the case of Naga, the Sixteenth Point agreement was inserted under Article 371A which ensured; 'no act of Parliament was applicable to the State of Nagaland on: (i) religious or social practices of the Nagas, (ii) Naga customary law and procedure, (iii) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law, (iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resources, unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides'

Tracing the origin of Article 371A, the Naga-Akbar Hydari Accord (Nine Point Agreement) of June 1947 still holds the bases of the Sixteenth Points Agreement.

Comparing the two, apart from others, the following had been influenced by the Nine Point Agreement and incorporated into the Sixteenth Points Agreement;

Nine Point Agreement	Sixteenth Points Agreement
1. Judicial – All cases whether civil or criminal arising between Nagas in the Naga Hills will be disposed of by duly constituted Naga Courts according to Naga customary law or such law as may be introduced with the consent of duly recognized Naga representative organizations: save that where a sentence of transportation or death has been passed there will be a right of appeal to the Governor.	7. Acts of Parliament: No Act or law passed by the Union Parliament affecting the following provisions shall have legal force in the Nagaland unless specially applied to it by a majority vote of the Nagaland legislative Assembly.
3. Legislative – That no laws passed by the Provincial or Central Legislature which would materially affect the terms of this agreement or the religious practices of the Nagas shall have legal force in the Naga Hills without the consent of the Naga Council.....	(a) The Religious or Social Practices of the Nagas. (b) The Customary Laws and Procedure. (c) Civil and Criminal Justice so far as these Concern decision according to the Naga Customary Law. The existing law relating to administration of civil and criminal justice as provided in the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Naga Hills District shall continue to be in force. (d) The ownership and transfer of law and its resources.
4. Land – That land with all its resources in the Naga Hills should not be alienated to a non-Naga without the consent of the Naga Council.	
8. Regulations – The Chin Hills regulations, 1896 and the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulations, 1873 will remain in force.	16. Inner Line Regulation: Rules embodied in the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873, shall remain in force in Nagaland

Source : Computed

What is further worth addressing that the ‘peace accord’ signed by the Naga had further influence the peace accord signed between the Government of India and the MNF on June 30, 1986. On the same line, the accord clearly states:

First, “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, no act of Parliament in respect of (a) Religion or Social practices of the Mizos, (b) Mizo customary Law or procedure, (c) Administration of Civil

and Criminal Justice involving decisions according to Mizo customary Law, (d) Ownership and transfer of land, shall apply to the State of Mizoram unless the Legislative Assembly of Mizoram by a resolution so decides.

Provided that nothing in this Clause shall apply to any Central Act in force in Mizoram immediately before the appointed day.” and

Secondly, “The Inner line Regulation, as now in force in Mizoram, will not be amended or repealed without consulting the State Government.”

The former had been inserted under Article 371G to the Constitution of India to protect the Mizo from ‘outside’ interference. Careful analysis on the Article 371G had clearly indicated that unlike the Sixteenth Points Agreement or Article 371A, it has two shortfalls or limitations: First, the word ‘resources’ had been omitted which implies that unlike Nagaland, the autonomy of the Mizoram State Assembly had been reduced to ‘land’ only. The second limitation of the Article 371G can be located on the ending clause which states, “Provided that nothing in this Clause shall apply to any Central Act in force in Mizoram immediately before the appointed day”. Since the Act became effective only after the formation of Statehood i.e., February 20, 1987, any Act that is in force in Mizoram prior to this date is not affected by the clauses under Article 371G. The State Assembly had been once again limited to only those Acts which came into force after the formation of statehood. It seems that the article was inserted in such a way to protect the Mizo in the future.

Conclusion

Though Article 371G may have various limitation as compare to Article 371A, in term of success, the ‘Accord’ signed by the MNF has become a remarkable phenomenon as compare to the Sixteenth Point Agreement or any other accord signed by the Indian

Government with any groups. There can be strong argument behind the success of the accord signed by the MNF; first, it was learnt that in the process of accord design, the MNF were only involved in the political dialogue, while the State Government and the civil society most importantly the Church (see, Lalngurauva 2008, Hluna 1988) created space for the peaceful process of the dialogue.¹ Moreover, the peace talk was also appeased by the major political party’s leaders who were ready to ‘sacrifice’ their position with the hope of regaining their power in the electoral process. This entire situation gave a wider space for the MNF to arrive at the conclusion on their own term.

On the same line, the Government of India was also cautious due to the failure of various accords signed particularly with the Naga which unable to delivered the promise even after successive accords. It seems that even the omission of the word ‘resources’ from the MoS was also insisted by the GoI to the MNF leaders, learning form the Naga experience that it can create more ‘problems’ in the future⁷. Thus the direct involvement of the MNF in the political dialogue and the receding of demands from independent to separate state with special federal arrangement were the reason behind the success of peace accord in Mizoram.

In the case of the Naga, the political contestation exists within different groups who wanted to champion Naga right to self determination on their own term.

There is strong contestation from different angle when one group initiates peace talk with the Indian State. Now the latest hope still lies on the 'Framework Agreement' of August 3, 2015. Whether the Ninth Point Agreement or the Sixteenth Points Agreement or the Shillong Agreement instead of conglomerated on mutual agreement, they further disintegrated the united movement and still continue to persist today.

Last, it would be unfair not to look into the positive aspect of the Naga's accords of 1947 and 1960 which led to the culmination of Article 371A and Article 371G for Nagaland and Mizoram respectively. The two provisions not only add new structured in Indian federal system but the only mean for the people of both the states to protect their ways of life from the 'reckless' intervention of the State.

End Notes

- 1 After a long discussion among the tribes represented on 26th, 27th and 28th June, 1947 at Kohima, Under the banner of NNC leaders like Aliba Imti and T. Sakhrie signed Nine-Point Agreement with Akbar Hydari, the then Governor of Assam.
- 2 In the Month of July, 1951, Political Parties leaders of the Hill Autonomous Districts held meeting in Shillong, the Naga representative do not attend the meeting in protest against the Sixth Schedule (Zoram Thupuan, 33, 18 August, 1951, p. 1.).
- 3 "Mizo Political Party Leader ho leh Lal Aiawh ho leh Mi pawimawh dangte committee duh dan Borsap ho a rel" (Proceeding of the Meeting of the Political leaders, Chiefs' representatives, NGOs and prominent citizen chaired by LL Peters, Superintendent, Lushai Hills), dated August 14, 1947. (No. 6927-76 G of 21-8-1947. Retrieved from Mizoram State Archive).
- 4 Since there was no Mizo representative in the Sub-committee, Ch. Saprawnga and Khawtinkhuma, both the Mizo Union leaders, were appointed as a co-opted members by the Bordoloi Sub-Committee.
- 5 In the North East, a special arrangement was made under- Article 371A for Nagaland; Article 371C for Manipur (Ins. by the Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Act, 1971, s. 5, w.e.f. 15-2-1972); Article 371 F for Sikkim Ins. by the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, s. 3, w.e.f. 26-4-1975); Article 371G for Mizoram (1Ins. by the Constitution (Fifty-third Amendment) Act, 1986, s. 2, w.e.f. 20-2-1987) and Article 371H for Arunachal Pradesh (2Ins. by the Constitution (Fifty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1986, s. 2, w.e.f. 20-2-1987).
- 6 Though Das (2007: 39) argued that unlike "Nagaland where the church played active role in initiating peace process, in Mizo it only made an appeal to end hostilities and

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bring peace back. Church leaders hardly worked for any political settlement of the problem”. But, what was worth noticing was that the non involvement of other parties whether church or other organisation in the political dialogue create a space for the MNF to come to their own definite term and bring peaceful solution with the Government.

- 7 Personal Interview with Zoramthanga, the present President of the Mizo National Front Party. He was the then Vice president of MNF when the Peace was signed. April 5, 2010, Ramhlun, Aizawl.

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